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Abstract: Are religious beliefs psychologically different from matter-of-fact 
beliefs? Many scholars say no: that religious people, in a matter-of-fact way, 
simply think their deities exist. Others say yes: that religious beliefs are more 
compartmentalized, less certain, and less responsive to evidence. Little research to 
date has explored whether lay people themselves recognize such a difference. We 
addressed this question in a series of sentence completion tasks, conducted in five 
settings that differed both in religious traditions and in language: the US, Ghana, 
Thailand, China, and Vanuatu. Participants everywhere routinely used different 
verbs to describe religious versus matter-of-fact beliefs, and they did so even 
when the ascribed belief contents were held constant and only the surrounding 
context varied. These findings support the view that people from diverse cultures 
and language communities recognize a difference in attitude type between 
religious belief and everyday matter-of-fact belief. 
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Introduction: Varieties of Belief 
Many people have beliefs about gods, ancestors, souls, and other supernatural 




have beliefs about whether it will rain, where their children are, or what time of year it is; such 
matter-of-fact beliefs are central to everyday life. 
Do people’s religious beliefs typically involve the same cognitive attitude as their matter-
of-fact beliefs? The phrase “cognitive attitudes” refers to the various ways humans process and 
relate to ideas about the world (Shah & Velleman, 2005; Van Leeuwen, 2014). A person might 
think that it’s about to rain, wonder whether it’s about to rain, assume, doubt, imagine, pretend, 
hope, or worry that it’s about to rain. At stake here is whether religious ideas—for all their 
importance—are usually processed in the same way as the matter-of-fact belief that it is about to 
rain. 
Many scholars say the cognitive attitudes are the same (Boudry & Coyne, 2016a, 2016b; 
Harris et al., 2009; Levy, 2017; Talmont-Kaminski, 2016). On this view, religious people just 
think gods and spirits exist, just like anyone simply thinks tables and chairs exist. Others hold 
that religious beliefs are different: more compartmentalized (Astuti & Harris, 2008; Harris & 
Giménez, 2005; Watson-Jones et al., 2016), more effortful (Boyer, 2013; Luhrmann, 2018), in 
need of regular voluntary practice (Luhrmann, 2012; Norenzayan, 2013), less certain (Clegg et 
al., 2019; Davoodi et al., 2018; Harris et al., 2006), less responsive to counterevidence (Liquin, 
Metz, & Lombrozo, 2020; Stanovich & Toplak, 2019; Van Leeuwen, 2017), and experienced as 
part of one’s identity (Durkheim, 1912).  
This debate concerns not the contents of religious vs. matter-of-fact belief but the 
attitude, or the way people relate to contents or ideas. Here is a philosophical characterization of 
this difference: For any content p (supernatural or naturalistic; scientific or not; observable or 





1) Karen doubts that it will rain. 
2) Sarah hopes that it will rain. 
3) Bob doubts that God exists. 
4) Arthur hopes that God exists. 
The italicized attitude contents reported in 1 and 2 are naturalistic, while 3 and 4 concern the 
supernatural. But the attitudes of doubting and hoping can occur with either kind of content. 
Now consider the attitudes one might hold toward these contents: 
5) Jane factually believes that Jesus was born in Bethlehem. 
6) Fred has the religious belief that Jesus was born in Bethlehem. 
Despite having the same contents, one might suggest that the second mental state, 6, is a 
reverential, identity-constituting attitude that is compartmentalized, less responsive to evidence, 
and less widely used than factual belief to support ordinary inferences. One of us (Van Leeuwen 
(2014)), for example, has argued that this is a much more typical attitude for religious contents. 
Others, however, such as Levy (2017), deny that there is such a difference in “belief” type: 
Religious beliefs are just factual beliefs that happen to be about supernatural contents (hence the 
title of his paper: “Religious beliefs are factual beliefs”). So the dispute comes down to whether 
a meaningfully different cognitive attitude of religious credence exists at all. 
In this paper, we present new data that speak to this important debate. Our studies tested 
whether lay people themselves recognize a difference between matter-of-fact and religious 
belief. We predicted that people from diverse cultural and religious settings would systematically 
choose different words for describing matter-of-fact vs. religious cognitive attitudes, thereby 




To date, one series of studies has addressed such a prediction. Heiphetz, Landers, & Van 
Leeuwen (2018) used corpus analyses as well as sentence completion tasks to show that 
American English speakers are more likely to use the word “believe” to describe religious beliefs 
(e.g., “Zane believes that Jesus turned water into wine”) but “think” to describe matter-of-fact 
beliefs (e.g., “Nick thinks that George Washington was the first U.S. President”). Importantly, 
this was so even when  they held reported attitude contents constant and varied the situation to 
make the surrounding context religious or non-religious. They thus concluded not only that there 
are distinct attitudes, but also that lay people are at some level aware of the difference and use 
available resources to express it.  
These earlier studies, however, left an important question open: How widespread is this 
distinction across cultures? Many observers hold that “religious belief” is only a Western, 
Christian and perhaps modern idea: Other people do not believe—they know (Asad, 1993; 
Smith, 1977). In a representative statement, Toren (2007: 307) writes: “We [anthropologists] 
may characterise as belief what our informants know and, in so doing, misrepresent them.” The 
implication is that the distinction surfaced in Heiphetz, Landers, & Van Leeuwen (2018) does 
not appear in non-Western, non-Christian contexts. Some anthropologists, however, have found 
that religious belief is indeed a distinct attitude in various non-Western cultures—for example, 
the Vezo in Madagascar and the Fang in Central Africa (Astuti & Harris, 2008; Boyer, 2013).  
Following recent calls to assess psychological theories in a variety of cultural settings 
(Henrich et al., 2010), we set out to test empirically whether people differentiate matter-of-fact 
and religious belief in culturally diverse field sites. The studies we present here were part of a 
larger project investigating cultural models of the mind and their relationship to spiritual 




China, and Vanuatu—chosen to include a variety of spiritual and religious practices (for more 
details on the project, see Luhrmann, 2020; Luhrmann, Weisman, et al., 2021). Participants were 
primarily Christian or religiously unaffiliated in the US, overwhelmingly Christian in Ghana and 
Vanuatu, Buddhist in Thailand, and religiously unaffiliated in China.  
For purposes of designing our study stimuli, we used a “minimum definition” of religion 
that would be useful cross-culturally: thought, talk, and practices that concern gods, spirits, or 
other supernatural beings (cf. Goody, 1961). Even in religious traditions that seem to have no 
spirits (such as Buddhism), participants often do have attitudes and practices that concern a wide 
range of spirits (Gross, 2002). That said, we used this definition provisionally, and we hold open 
the possibility that in some cultural contexts people’s religious attitudes can concern other 
subject matters as well (see General Discussion).  
In the US, studies were conducted in English and featured the words think and believe, 
following Heiphetz, Landers, & Van Leeuwen (2018). For other countries, counterparts to 
“think” and “believe” were chosen in consultation with native speakers and anthropologists with 
local expertise. These counterparts were not expected to be exact semantic matches. Rather, we 
predicted that people would use them in parallel ways to track the distinction between religious 
and matter-of-fact belief. In Ghana, studies were conducted in Fante (an Akan dialect) and 
focused on the words dwen and gye dzi. In Thailand, studies were conducted in Thai and focused 
on the words คิด (kit) and เชื'อ (chư̄a). In China, studies were conducted in Mandarin (in the variety 
known as Standard Chinese) and focused on the words 认为 (rènwéi) and 相信 (xiāngxìn). In 
Vanuatu, studies were conducted in Bislama (an English-based creole) and focused on the words 




To be clear: Our main interest in these studies was not in the semantics of these pairs of 
words per se, but in the way that people use them to express distinct cognitive attitudes. Our 
hypothesis was that the ability to do so is widespread across cultures; we predicted that people 
would think differently about religious and matter-of-fact beliefs and that these different 
understandings would manifest as differential use of words like “think” and “believe” in 
sentence completion tasks. We have not in these studies addressed the following questions: (1) 
How many other ways can the words we focused on be used, aside from the ways we focus on 
here? (2) To what extent do the verb pairs we focus on have resembling semantic profiles across 
languages, aside from being close enough to facilitate a test of our prediction? (3) How did 
cultural influences shape the semantics and pragmatics of these words over historical time? 
Beyond providing a test for the hypothesis we have fleshed out here, we hope that the studies 
that follow provide a launching point for investigating those related questions. 
Our three studies, which closely follow  Heiphetz, Landers, & Van Leeuwen’s (2018) 
experimental studies, each tested whether lay people use the pairs of words indicated above to 
communicate a difference between matter-of-fact and religious beliefs. For each study, we 
predicted that participants would be more likely to use “believe” (or its hypothesized 
counterpart) for religious belief than for matter-of-fact belief. (Our studies were preregistered at 
https://aspredicted.org/p6iy3.pdf; see Supplement for complete preregistered analyses, as well as 
further details on method.) 
Study 1: Forced Choice (“Think” vs. “Believe”) 
Study 1 provided an initial test of our prediction.  
Participants (N=344; n=48-97 per site) were presented with 25 sentences in one of two 




where X was a propositional phrase (e.g., John [thinks / believes] that Jesus Christ died for 
human sins). Participants selected one of the two words to complete the sentence. In the US, 
Thailand, China, and Vanuatu, participants completed a pen-and-paper survey. In Ghana, the 
study was administered orally at a rural site, since Fante is rarely written; at this location, a 
research assistant read each item out loud and recorded verbal responses.  
Ten of these sentences were “religious”: The complement phrase included Christian 
content (e.g., Jesus Christ died for human sins) or Buddhist content (e.g., the Buddha found 
spiritual truth while meditating).  
The remaining 15 sentences were “matter-of-fact”: The complement included a widely-
known fact (e.g., Brazil is in South America), a less-widely-known fact (e.g., bronze contains 
more copper than tin), or a personal life fact (e.g., her dad is cooking noodles for dinner). 
A mixed effects logistic regression revealed that, as predicted, participants were generally 
more likely to select “believe” (or its counterpart) to complete religious vs. matter-of-fact 





























































Response think believe NA
Figure 1: Study 1 results. Participants in all field sites were more likely to select “believe” (or its 




attitude ascriptions (b=0.20, p<0.001). This distinction was more pronounced in Thailand and 
the US, and less pronounced in Ghana; it did not differ from the grand mean in China or Vanuatu 
(see Table S3 for complete results). Nonetheless, secondary analyses confirmed that this 
difference was significant in each field site considered alone (US: b=0.24, p<0.001; Ghana: 
b=0.09, p=0.010; Thailand: b=0.27, p<0.001; China: b=0.19, p<0.001; Vanuatu: b=0.20, 
p<0.001; see Table S4 and Figure 1). 
 
Study 2: Free Response  
In Study 2, a separate group of participants (N=388; n=46-100 per site) completed the 
same sentences using a word or phrase of their own free choice. Methods were otherwise 
identical to Study 1.  
Echoing Study 1, participants were more likely to generate responses containing the 
word-stem “believe” (or its counterpart) for religious compared to matter-of-fact attitude 
ascriptions (b=0.13, p<0.001). Indeed, in four of these five sites, “believe” (or its counterpart) 


























































































































































Response type think believe know other
Figure 2: Study 2 results. Participants in all field sites were more likely to generate responses containing the word stem 
“believe” (or its counterparts) to complete religious vs. matter-of-fact sentences. This plot presents 13 word stems that 




appeared in the plurality of free responses to religious sentences; see Figure 2. The difference 
between religious and matter-of-fact sentences was more pronounced in the US and China, less 
pronounced in Ghana and Vanuatu, and did not vary from the grand mean among participants in 
Thailand (see Table S11). But again, this difference was significant in each field site considered 
alone (US: b=0.20, p<0.001; Ghana: b=0.06, p<0.001; Thailand: b=0.14, p<0.001; China: 
b=0.17, p<0.001; Vanuatu: b=0.09, p<0.001; see Table S12). 
Study 3: Vignette Completion 
Study 3 (N=328; n=49-80 per site) provided a final, closely controlled test of our primary 
claim. Methods were similar to Study 1, except that, rather than completing attitude ascriptions 
that were either religious or matter-of-fact in content, there were five pairs of brief vignettes that 
set up either a matter-of-fact or religious context, but ended with the same final sentence which 
the participant had to complete. For example: 
Kerry had bad headaches in the afternoons all last year. Sometimes her friends 
offered her aspirin. But Kerry took courses at a medical school. That school 
teaches that drinking water is the way to cure a headache and aspirin is not. So 
Kerry always refused the aspirin her friends offered. That’s because she [ thinks / 
believes ] that aspirin is not a cure. 
 
Terry had bad headaches in the afternoons all last year. Sometimes her friends 
offered her aspirin. But Terry belonged to the Church of Christ Scientist. That 
church teaches that prayer is the way to cure illness and medicine is not. So Terry 
always refused the aspirin her friends offered. That’s because she [ thinks / 
believes ] that aspirin is not a cure.  
 
This allowed us to test ascriptions of cognitive attitudes while holding the ascribed content 
constant. In this case, Kerry and Terry might be ascribed different attitudes to the same content: 




Vignettes were presented in one of two counterbalanced orders, with paired vignettes 
separated from each other. “Religious” vignettes included diverse religious traditions, and 
“matter-of-fact” vignettes were scientific, historical, or commonsensical in nature.  
As predicted, participants were generally more likely to select “believe” (or its 
counterpart) when the sentence was embedded in a religious vignette as opposed to the matching 
matter-of-fact vignette (b=0.10, p=0.010). This distinction was more pronounced in the US and 
Thailand, less pronounced in Ghana, and did not differ from the grand mean among participants 
in China or Vanuatu (see Table S20). The difference was significant in four of the five sites 
considered alone (US: b=0.15, p<0.001; Thailand: b=0.15, p=0.009; China: b=0.11, p=0.033; 
Vanuatu: b=0.08, p=0.049; see Table S21 and Figure 3). The difference was not significant in 
our sample from rural Ghana (b=0.02, p=0.747), but it did appear to be present in a sample of 
Ghanaian undergraduates in a small follow-up study (see Supplement).  
 





























































Response think believe NA
Figure 3: Study 3 results. Participants in the US, Thailand, China, and Vanuatu—but not 
Ghana—were more likely to select “believe” (or counterparts) to complete an attitude report 





To step back, across Studies 1 and 2, participants were generally more likely to use the 
word “believe” (or its counterparts in other languages) to describe cognitive attitudes that relate 
to gods, ancestors, souls, and other supernatural phenomena, than to describe matter-of-fact 
beliefs. In Study 3, which featured cognitive attitudes with neutral contents, participants were 
more likely to use “believe” when the surrounding vignette made clear that the attitude in 
question was held in a religious context than when the surrounding vignette provided a matter-
of-fact context. 
We consider this to be evidence that matter-of-fact beliefs and religious beliefs involve 
distinct cognitive attitudes, that awareness of the difference is widespread among human cultural 
groups, and that this distinction manifests in the word choices of people speaking a wide variety 
of languages.  
Across all our studies and sites, there was only one exception to the pattern that held 
everywhere else: Among Ghanaian participants, preferential use of gye dzi (the Fante counterpart 
to “believe”) for religious as opposed to matter-of-fact attitudes was present, but attenuated, in 
Studies 1-2, and absent in Study 3. This may simply be an experimental artifact, but it raises the 
intriguing possibility that in Ghana—a setting where thought and talk about the supernatural is 
quite commonplace (Dulin, 2020; Dzokoto, 2020)—many people hold more matter-of-fact 
attitudes about religious ideas [see Supplement for further discussion]. Conversely, there may 
also be cultural settings or spheres of discourse in which people hold “religious” belief attitudes 
about factual content; for example, recent years have made it clear that beliefs about such “here-
and-now” matters as disease transmission and election security can become central parts of 




Our studies ruled out possible alternate explanations for the main pattern we found 
(discussed in more detail in the Supplement).  
First, if participants used the word “believe” (or counterparts) merely to indicate that the 
protagonist of the sentence or vignette was uncertain or unconfident, then we would likely have 
seen greater incidence of “believe” for less well-known content—items designated a priori as 
“less-widely-known facts”—than for well-known facts in Studies 1-2 (for a discussion of the 
relation between belief confidence and perceived consensus, see Shtulman, 2013: 207). But no 
such pattern emerged, so mere ascription of lesser confidence is unlikely to be what participants 
were indicating with their differential word choice.  
Second, if participants used the word “believe” only to indicate that they themselves 
disagreed with the attributed attitude, then we likely would have found an effect of religion, with 
people using “believe” (or counterparts) more for religions other than their own. No such pattern 
emerged. In fact, particularly in the most devoutly Christian samples—in Ghana and Vanuatu—
people were even more likely to use “believe” in sentences with content from their own religion.  
Third, if “believe” reflected only religious content (rather than a difference in cognitive 
attitude), then we wouldn’t have seen the differences that we saw in Study 3, in which 
propositional complements were matched exactly and only the broader context varied.  
In fact, Study 3 also addressed a range of further content-based explanations of the 
effects that surfaced in Studies 1 and 2. One might, for example, argue that the effects in Studies 
1 and 2 emerged because people were using “believe” for unobservable subjects and “think” for 
observable subjects, or that they were using “believe” for ideas that were matters of opinion and 




attitude contents held fixed (e.g., that aspirin is not a cure), there couldn’t be a difference in 
what the respective attitudes were about.  
Nonetheless, these studies raise a range of interesting questions for future research. Might 
differential use of verbs like “believe” vs. “think” also indicate differences between moral and 
non-moral cognitive attitudes, between beliefs arrived at reflectively vs. intuitively, or between 
more and less speculative cognitive attitudes in science? Finding such patterns would not conflict 
with the results here; rather, they would complement our overall outlook by affirming that people 
in general have the cognitive flexibility to understand and express nuanced differences in 
cognitive attitude type.  
Fourth and finally, if the differentiation between matter-of-fact belief and religious belief 
were unique to Western contexts, we would not have seen the striking similarities across cultures 
that we did.  
Our results are most parsimoniously explained by our main hypothesis: Matter-of-fact 
belief and religious belief are distinct cognitive attitudes, and people in many different cultures 
and language communities are aware of the difference. The cognitive flexibility needed to utilize 
and differentiate these attitudes is not specific to Westerners, Christians, scholars or some other 
rarefied group; instead, it appears to be widely shared. Matter-of-fact beliefs are likely used in a 
problem-solving way to achieve practical goals, while religious beliefs are used in guiding 
symbolic actions expressive of sacred values (Atran & Axelrod, 2008); thus, tracking the 
distinction between them may allow people to better understand and predict others’ behaviors. 
Indeed, this distinction may be one of the common features of a theory of mind that we 
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